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The 20th century did not only see the rise of academic sociology, but highlighted also strife 
within societies that resulted in specific forms of totalitarianism. Literature on the 
relationship of sociology and these totalitarianisms is controversial. Some authors state that 
sociology is not a natural antipode to dictatorships: Some sociologists like Sombart and 
Michels were active proponents of totalitarian ideology, and most totalitarian regimes quite 
liked the technical expertise of social research. Other authors propose that a flourishing 
sociology needs a certain form of society characterized by openness and tolerance to find a 
constructive climate for theoretical reflection, empirical research and practical relevance. 
From this position one could state that there is a “Wahlverwandtschaft”, a structural affinity, 
between sociology and democracy. 
The article uses empirical material from a case study on the development of sociology at the 
University of Halle between 1900 and 1990. The University of Halle is an interesting case in 
so far as in this East German university the societal context varies between monarchy, 
democracy, fascism and communism. The empirical material focuses on published and 
unpublished work of Friedrich Hertz and Rudhard Stollberg, as well as archive material to 
their activities and conflicts. Specific dead ends of forms of historical sociology and empirical 
sociology are analysed with regard to the guiding question, whether there is a structural 
tension between forms of totalitarianism and sociology. 
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Dead ends in the development of a scientific discipline can be the result of either an external force 
bringing a fruitful development to a sudden end, or the effect of an inner logic driving one to the 
conclusion that a certain approach fails to achieve the results that one hoped to gain. In social 
sciences the causal attribution of a dead end is sometimes a topic of heated debate, because a forced 
standstill may attract later generations to pursue the same path whereas a self-declared failure 
signals “change path” to potential successors.  
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Discussions in post-fascist West German sociology were highly controversial after a published 
remark by Helmut Schelsky that German sociology in the Weimar Republic had reached a dead end 
due to a failure of its scientific programme: “the melodies were played through” (Schelsky 1959: 37). 
Sociologists like René König (1984, 1958), who were in exile during the Nazi period, were shocked 
by this remark, and repeatedly argued that large parts of German sociology were driven into exile by 
force. Strong sociological programs were beginning to spread, especially at the end of the Weimar 
period. In hindsight, this discussion in German sociology at the end of the 1950s intermingled 
personal and professional interests and scientific analysis. There was the delicate issue that a 
minority of sociologists remained in Germany under the Nazi system, including Schelsky, which both 
Schelsky and König kept in the background. 
In this paper I want to generalize this controversy with the following research question: Why does 
sociology run into dead ends in totalitarian societies? It seems that some disciplines are more 
interwoven with social structure than others. It is likely that social sciences would be more dependent 
on a certain structure of society than natural sciences. For example, it would be astonishing to see a 
discussion on the dead end of chemistry at the close of the Weimar Republic. Some of the best 
chemists of that time were driven into exile, which stopped some development in this field, but no 
one thinks that chemistry as a discipline was at a dead end at this time. As a guiding, and quite risky, 
hypothesis to be tested and refined in this paper, one could even emphasize that the scientific 
discipline of sociology is not only more dependent on social structures than other scientific 
disciplines, but that it is somehow related to a certain social structure—namely democracy—in order 
to flourish. This might be described as an elective affinity between sociology and democracy. 
The argument develops in five sections in this paper. In the first, tendencies are described that point 
towards this affinity. The second examines theories explaining a tension between sociology and 
totalitarian regimes and an affinity between sociology and democracy. The third sketches the 
empirical methods used in this analysis. The fourth presents results from a case study of sociology 
in an East German university during the 20th Century. The fifth and final section discusses the results 
of the case study and draws attention to the limits of this study. 
1. Totalitarian and democratic societies and sociology 
Do we have material to form an initial suspicion that there might be an elective affinity between 
sociology and democracy and some tension between sociology and non-democratic societies? To 
answer, one has to be more precise on the meaning of sociology. We define sociology as a science 
that is institutionalized as an academic discipline and which refers to formation processes of societies 
that call themselves societies. Therefore, we do not include in this definition of sociology any social 
thought, e.g. of Aristotle, that was not put forward with reference to explicitly mentioned societies. 
So, by this definition, one prerequisite of sociology is a society that develops a concept of society. In 
our narrow sense of the meaning of sociology, we also do not include sociological thinking that is not 
institutionalized in academic disciplines. Social philosophers like Comte, Marx, and Spencer were 
important for the history of sociology, but they were not successful in institutionalizing sociology. 
Thus, we propose that institutionalization of the academic discipline sociology is a second 
prerequisite for the existence of sociology. 
The second concept used here is democracy. This is defined as a formal state government structure 
in which at intervals a broad electorate chooses its governing parties in free and fair elections. 
Decisive for this concept is that there exists a legal state separate from the personal possession of the 
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ruler, and structured pluralistic political processes that transfer power for a limited period of time. 
A seemingly vague notion in this definition is the term “broad electorate,” which reflects degrees of 
democratization: i.e. the percentage of certified voters in relation to the adult population of a state 
territory. 
There is scientific consensus on the fact that the concept of society is a semantic used primarily by 
modern societies following the big shift of semantics at the beginning of the 19th century (Koselleck 
1979: 24). Some stress Paine’s rather broad idea of “society” in pamphlets before the American War 
of Independence as the starting point (Paine 1776) as the innovative set of semantics. Others point 
to the reference to the more elaborate argumentation of Joseph Sieyès in generalizing the Tiers État 
at the onset of the French revolution (Sieyès 1789; Institut für Sozialforschung 1956: 23), and others 
the theoretical conception of a civil society by Hegel (1820) (Riedel 1975). Most agree, however, that 
the concept of society is not a semantic of pre-modern societies, most of which were not democratic. 
It was the legitimations of two decisive political revolutions that began civil societies’ use of the 
concept of society, as both Paine’s and Sieyès’ pamphlets show. The case of Hegel, however, 
illustrates that once the concept is established one does not have to be a personal supporter of 
democracies to use these semantics. 
Auguste Comte introduced the notion of sociology. Most commentators agree, however, that the 
inception of a social science called sociology did not occur before the turn of the 20th century. 
Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber are seen as major figures in the development of the concept of 
sociology as a scientific discipline (Abel 1970). In hindsight, some sociologists would add several 
names of founding fathers and mothers, some may remove one or two of the aforementioned trio, 
but the majority would mention at least one of them. 
During the period in which sociology was established, in one programmatic paper defining sociology 
as a discipline published in 1894/95 in German, French, and American scientific journals, Simmel 
tried to establish a formal sociology. This focused on processes of interdependence, and tried to 
detach itself from concepts of a holistic society. In 1908, he rephrases the “problem of sociology” and 
states that “… the claims, that the science of sociology tends to raise, [are] the theoretical 
continuation and reflection of practical power, which in the nineteenth century the masses have 
acquired in opposition to the interests of the individual. But the feeling of importance and the 
attention, which the lower classes forced from the higher classes, is supported especially by the 
concept of “society” (Simmel 1992: 13). In other words, Simmel parallels a social movement—a 
movement towards more power sharing—as a “practical power” that is transferred to the scientific 
discipline sociology. Already Simmel’s contrasting of “masses” and “individual” signals that he does 
not see the academic discipline of sociology as a supporter of this democratic movement; in his time 
“masses” was a derogatory term for large electorates.  
Whereas Simmel is successful conceptually in separating the concept of a value-free academic 
sociology and a democratic movement, he does not achieve this differentiation; he is an object of 
evaluation by a conservative state himself. Despite his broad audience at Berlin University, and his 
seminal publications, he is not made a full professor until 1914. The Prussian ministry rejects his 
faculty’s application for Simmel’s professorship in 1898, arguing that he is a sociologist; i.e. a 
suspicious radical (Rammstedt 1992: 888)! Simmel’s case illustrates how the establishment of the 
academic discipline of sociology might be characterized by three prerequisites: A process in a society 
establishing a society semantics; theoretical and empirical scientific work that forms the basis of a 
new discipline; and a government structure that allows this new discipline to institutionalize itself at 
university level. The historical pattern of the establishment of sociology in its origin countries shows 
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that the last point, which is sometimes neglected in the literature, is quite important (Sutherland 
1978). Democratic government structures seemed to be more open to the institutionalization of the 
new social science, sociology. Sociology is institutionalized in universities in the two largest 
democracies—USA and France—at the turn of the 20th century. The case of the United States is 
interesting. By 1909, there were 55 full-time and 372 part-time professors in sociology (Steinmetz 
2010: 9), despite the fact that the coherence of the theoretical and empirical scientific work of 
American sociology was still rather vague. French sociology was institutionalized in universities in 
1896. Indeed, the classic work of Durkheim shows its intellectual vigor at that time. In contrast, three 
large countries with mixed monarchy-democracy structures, Germany, Austria, and Great Britain, 
did not institutionalize sociology at university level before 1907: Britain in 1907 (Halsey 2004: 3); 
Germany in 1919 (Sutherland 1978); and Austria last of the three in 1919 (Langer 1988). The German 
case is instructive. Despite the strong scientific program of early 20th century sociology, now 
regarded as classic, there was not a single sociology professorship before the democratic revolution 
in 1918. In terms of an elective affinity between sociology and democracy, one could state that 
historically sociology had a higher likelihood of being chosen for institutionalization in universities 
earlier in large democratic societies. At the same time less democratic governments rejected attempts 
to institutionalize sociology because it was seen as too democratic, even when sociologists tried to 
distance themselves from democratic movements. Ringer’s (1969) classic study elaborates the 
difficulties and ambivalences of the modernist German mandarins, who are at the center of the 
establishment of German sociology. An irony of the negative logic of an elective affinity between 
sociology and democracy is that democratic revolutions in Germany and Austria successfully 
institutionalized sociology in universities, but in a continuation of its democratic lag, some of the 
first sociologists picked by the conservative university establishments—such as like Freyer in Leipzig 
or Spann in Vienna—were anti-democrats.  
If there is an elective affinity between democracy and sociology, one might suppose that there is also 
an inherent tension between totalitarianism (as an antidote to democracy) and sociology. We define 
a totalitarian regime as a state government structure in which one party governs without set time 
limitations, without legal opposition, and cherishing some kind of Weltanschauung. In contrast to 
pre-modern government structures in totalitarian regimes there is a state but, unlike democracies, 
there is no pluralistic competition between parties and no formal procedures of a change of 
government initiated by the broad electorate. Rather vague in this definition of totalitarianism is the 
notion of a specific Weltanschauung as most 20th century dictatorships legitimize themselves using 
some kind of more-or-less systematic ideology. According to this definition, National Socialist 
Germany, the Communist Soviet Union and Mobutu’s Zaire would all be totalitarian regimes, despite 
the fact that the number of books explaining the dominant ideology varies in these States.  
With regard to the general description of the relation between sociology and totalitarian regimes, 
contrary to some exaggerations by early post-war sociologists one can state that there were a number 
of sociologists working in fascist Germany (Klingemann 1996) and Italy, however much 
institutionalized sociology was hampered. In Germany, all efforts by right wing sociologists like 
Freyer or Sombart to gain broad support from the new Nazi dictatorship were unsuccessful because 
the Nazi establishment viewed sociology as a product of the hated Weimar Republic (Stölting 1984). 
The relationship between communist totalitarian regimes and sociology differed according to the 
scientific traditions in the various countries. In the Soviet Union, sociology was banned between the 
mid 1920s and the 1960s. In East Germany, sociology was not allowed between 1950 and the mid 
1960s. In Communist China, sociology as a scientific discipline was kept away from universities until 
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1979 (Gransow 1992). Communist Albania did not allow sociology until 1986. The situations in 
Communist Poland and Yugoslavia were somewhat less suppressive. 
With regard to the thesis of tension between sociology and totalitarian regimes, there is no clear 
indication that professional sociologists, or their organizations, refused to work in totalitarian 
regimes, as show in the examples of Freyer and his colleagues, or Polish sociology in the post-war 
period. However, in both fascist and in communist regimes, we find explicit policies against the 
discipline of sociology, more than against any natural science, and also somewhat harsher than any 
measures against most other social science disciplines.  
A third type of state that was dominant in most parts of the world during the first half of the 20th 
century is still rather neglected by research on the history of sociology. Given that this case study’s 
empirical material does not refer to this type of society, I just want to mention general tendencies. 
Societies governed by a colonial regime are non-democratic by nature; they crumble as soon as 
general elections are allowed. If one looks at sociology in colonial societies, in very few cases 
sociology can be detected before de-colonialization. Colonial rulers appear to institutionalize 
anthropology/ethnology instead of sociology to signal a distance between rulers and the ruled (Keim 
2008). This one might conclude that there is also a tension between sociology and colonial regimes, 
as with other non-democratic societies. 
To summarize this first chapter, it can be stated that, in general, there is a higher likelihood of 
sociology being institutionalized as an academic discipline in democracies than in non-democratic 
societies. Periods of tension, and sometimes even explicit suppression of sociology, is not uncommon 
in fascist and communist regimes. In other non-democratic societies, like colonies without self-rule 
or mixed monarchy-democracy structures, sociology tends to either not be institutionalized or be 
institutionalized later than in democracies. However, the elective affinity between democracy and 
sociology and its counterpart—a tension between non-democratic societies and sociology—seems 
more probabilistic than determinist, like most social science correlations (Goldthorpe 2002). 
Considering the nature of actions behind this elective affinity, one gets the impression that a rejection 
of sociology by non-democratic regimes is more common than an active exclusive propagation of 
democracy by sociologists who vary in their views. Why is there tension between totalitarian regimes 
and sociology?  
2. Theories on the relation of totalitarian regimes and sociology 
Explanatory theories that state a causal link as to why totalitarian regimes quite often form a tense 
position towards sociology are scarce. Merton (1968) gives a rather general theory. He sees a 
structural co-evolution of democracy and science with science getting the opportunity to develop 
independently in democracies. According to Merton, the guiding imperatives of science in general 
are universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized scepticism. Tensions between 
science and totalitarian regimes result from anti-rationalism in the Weltanschauung of the latter and 
from the “rather … diffuse, frequently vague apprehension that scepticism threatens the current 
distribution of power” (ibid: 615).  
Merton’s is a theory of tension between science in general and totalitarian regimes, but offers no 
specific hypothesis as to why sociology should be special within all science disciplines. Different 
suggestions are put forward in the literature. Some authors take it as an effect of the demography of 
the scientists in sociology: e.g. because the proportion of Jews among sociologists was higher than 
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in other disciplines, the proportion of its émigrés was high during the fascist regime in Germany 
(Käsler 1984). If this hypothesis is conclusive, the tension between totalitarian regimes and sociology 
could be simply coincidental.  
Another group of authors stresses more central ideas of sociology that tend to clash with totalitarian 
regimes. For example, Eisermann (1959) sees sociology as a born opposition science and Neuloh 
(1986) views its critique of ideology as a nuisance for totalitarian rulers. More complex, though 
similar, for Geiger (1956) sociology is born at the end of the 18th century when a “free society emerged 
against the organized state” (ibid: 11) by criticizing power per se. As an empirical, analytical, and 
critical science, sociology continues this idea, which runs counter to the central principles of 
totalitarian states, which only have use for self-glorification and social engineering. If Geiger’s 
hypothesis is correct, the critical inner logic of ‘sociology proper’ will clash with totalitarianism, 
which would only tolerate a ‘sociology light’ in the form of social engineering and Geiger would not 
call this sociology. 
There are interesting variants of Geiger’s theory in the literature. Habermas (1992) states that 
German sociology arises as a sociology of culture and knowledge critically related to German 
humanities that cannot be continued in forced exile. Whereas Habermas focusses on the inner logic 
of ideas finding a dead end in external events, Stölting (1984) stresses the motives of the totalitarian 
regime. Nazi elites believed in the public image of sociology, which was seen as liberal, socialist, and 
connected with the Weimar Republic. Therefore all attempts of right wing sociologists like Freyer 
were rebuffed and only a ‘sociology light’ of single working sociologists without institutionalization 
of the discipline sociology was tolerated. According to Stölting’s theory, the decisive moment of the 
tension between sociology and a totalitarian regime is that the latter believes in the critical, 
democratic image of sociology, independent of the fact that individual sociologists try to set 
themselves apart from this image. 
The normative implications of Geiger’s theory are stressed in a strand of the literature, which 
accentuates that only a critical ‘sociology proper,’ fighting actively against totalitarianism, would be 
worthwhile. Wittebur (1991) claims that nearly all émigrés failed, as they did not write the seminal 
analysis that shattered totalitarian rule. In a similar vein, Hannah Arendt criticized sociology as a 
discipline of social engineering, taking Mannheim’s ideology and utopia as an example (!), whereas 
she wanted an existentialist critique of the diabolic nature of totalitarianism (Baehr 2002). 
In conclusion, theories on the tension between totalitarian regimes and sociology (as well as an 
elective affinity between sociology and democracy) fluctuate between normative statements and 
empirical observations; between system level typologies and explanations of patterns of action. It 
seems important, therefore, to be precise about the mechanisms by which the tension between 
sociology and totalitarian regimes is produced, and through which the elective affinity between 
democracy and sociology created. This is important, as dead ends in sociology through totalitarian 
regimes might be produced in different ways. One thesis is that dead ends of sociology in totalitarian 
regimes occur more or less coincidentally, more as a reflection of the composition of its actors than 
of any attribute of its science. An alternative hypothesis in line with Geiger is that there are parts of 
the scientific core of sociology proper that are suppressed by totalitarian regimes because they are 
opposed to their power structure. A sub-hypothesis of the Geiger thesis is that only sociology light in 
the form of propaganda or social engineering can survive in totalitarian regimes. A fourth hypothesis 
is that totalitarian perceptions of sociology as a critical science bring about dead ends in sociology. A 
fifth hypothesis states that the forced shift of context via emigration produces dead ends in sociology.  
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3. Methods  
The empirical method used in this paper is a case study on sociology at an East German university 
during the 20th century. As a qualitative case study no generalizing conclusions on the frequency of 
occurrence of observed practices can be drawn. The aim of the analysis is to understand whether 
there are mechanisms that tend to produce tension between a totalitarian regime and sociology and, 
if yes, to determine their nature.  
East Germany during the 20th century seemed to be a good place for such a study as there were a 
broad variety of regimes. From 1900 to 1918 there was a mixed monarchy-democracy regime, from 
1918 to 1933 the state was democratic, in 1933 this gave way to a fascist regime, which collapsed in 
1945 and was followed by a communist dictatorship until 1990, returning to democracy after from 
1990 to 2000. Halle University, the subject of this study, was founded in 1694 and throughout 20th 
century was a “normal” middle-sized university. During the period of the observation it was part of 
the federal state of Prussia until 1933 and since 1990 has belonged to the state of Saxony-Anhalt. 
This study is interested in dead ends and for this reason we end it in 1992. Thus re-establishment of 
sociology after democratization will be ignored.  
Being interested in institutionalized sociology as a scientific discipline, we use a very narrow 
definition of core sociology; professors who have the word sociology in their title. We will concentrate 
on two main figures, Friedrich Hertz (1930–1933) and Rudhard Stollberg (1965–1990), who fulfill 
this criteria. A third figure, Ernst Grünfeld (1929–1933), will also be briefly reviewed. Grünfeld 
seems to be an interesting case with which to study the relationship between sociology and its dead 
ends. For these three professors rich material was both accessible and used. Besides publications of 
these authors, Hertz kept the manuscripts of his Halle lectures, which we copied at the archive for 
the history of sociology in the Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Austria. Halle University archives 
were consulted on all three subjects of study. In the case of Rudhard Stollberg, documents from the 
archives of the secret state police (Stasi) were used to reconstruct the conflicts around the 
dissertation of Bahro. An archive of the department of sociology in communist times was also found 
in the attic of its building which included, among other objects, titles of seminar papers (cf. 
Pasternack and Sackmann 2013). 
4. Case study: Dead ends of sociology in Halle 
The following chapter analyses dead ends in the development of sociology at the University of Halle 
during the 20th century. Although we will focus on the end of the Weimar Republic and the time of 
the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR), it is useful to briefly review the situation before 
1918, which we call a monarchic-democratic regime. 
4.1 GRÜNFELD AND SOCIOLOGY BEFORE SOCIOLOGY 
From 1694 until 1918 there was neither a sociology professorship at the Halle University nor. one 
single university course that includes the term sociology in its title. Why doesn’t sociology exist as an 
academic discipline in Halle before 1918? It seems futile to give an answer to a question on the non-
existence of an object, as there is no parallel in Halle to the efforts of Simmel and his Berlin University 
to establish a professorship of sociology. We think it is useful to take a closer look at the Ernst 
Grünfeld’s dissertation, defended in 1908 at the university of Halle, as it gives an idea as to why both 
the potential for the existence of sociology as a discipline and its rejection are traceable in Halle. 
Sciences of the state (Staatswissenschaft) was the term used before 1945, which self-characterized 
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the social sciences in Germany at that time. It encompassed disciplines that today one would call 
macroeconomics, business studies, political sciences and sociology. Dominant within this spectrum 
was macroeconomics. In Halle, Gustav Schmoller, Johannes Conrad, and Heinrich Waentig were all 
situated in the main stream of German economics; the Historical School of Economics, which was 
organized around the Verein fuer Socialpolitik.  
Waentig, the supervisor of Grünfeld’s dissertation on Lorenz von Stein, can be seen to be interested 
in sociology as his 1894 dissertation was on the predecessors of Auguste Comte. Waentig’s political 
orientation, however, is quite unusual in the German Kaiserreich. He was to become a deputy for the 
left wing Social Democratic Party to the Prussian Parliament during the Weimar Republic. 
Grünfeld’s topic is also quite unusual as it is the first comprehensive monograph on Lorenz von Stein 
in Germany. Lorenz von Stein is praised in this book as the first social scientist in Germany to 
introduce “Gesellschaftslehre” (discipline of society) in a systematic way in 1842 and thus became—
despite heavy criticism by Treitschke and Roscher—the founding father of the Historical School of 
Economics. After a thorough discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the work of von Stein, in 
the last chapter Grünfeld (1910: 206–257) evaluates the effects of von Stein’s social science approach. 
In this context, there is an interesting discussion of the relation between sociology and social 
sciences. Grünfeld argues that demands for chairs in sociology are unfounded as it is still “fruitless” 
(ibid: 213), whereas the integration of social science approaches in economics—as done by Bücher 
and von Schmoller—was more productive. More generally, Grünfeld states that the introduction of 
sociology in the US and France, which he observes is due to the “universality, its other side being a 
certain superficiality” (ibid: 245), characteristic of these countries. This “seems to be not adequate 
for the German essence” (ibid.), which aims at specialization. Therefore, the incorporation of social 
science topics into economics, which happened in Germany, is seen as preferable to the 
institutionalization of sociology. 
Analyzing these passages, one can state that even in progressive groups of young German social 
scientists, sociology was seen as something “not German”; something that was only suitable for 
“superficial” democratic countries. The somewhat bizarre argument of national characteristics of 
sciences proves the pattern of a non-introduction of sociology in monarchic Germany. Beside the 
vivid language of this treatise written two years before the foundation of the German sociological 
association, it also shows that even scientific authors like Grünfeld, writing on topics which are rather 
sociological, seem to have the impression that it is prudent to distance themselves from “foreign” 
sociology to be successful in academia. 
4.2 HERTZ AND THE DEAD END OF SOCIOLOGY 1933 
After the democratic revolution of 1918, the position of sociology in the academic field changed. The 
first professorship of sociology was awarded in Germany in 1919 and following this we see a broad 
institutionalization of sociology in German universities (Lepsius 1981). In Halle, institutionalization 
took place in 1929–30, when the Austrian Friedrich Hertz was appointed as an ordinary professor of 
economic sciences of the state and sociology. In part, his appointment was an effect of a 
democratization process, as the Prussian ministry insisted, against a reluctant department of the 
sciences of the state, on making a designation that included sociology (Böhme et al. 2013: 56–57). 
Hertz was a compromise candidate acceptable to the liberal minded economic department which, at 
the time, consisted of Aubin and Jahn. Ernst Grünfeld and Friedrich Hertz are added to the 
professorial body in 1929–30. 
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Even among the non-uniform sociologists of his day, Hertz was unusual. He was a scientist of the 
state by training and had attended the universities Vienna, Munich, and the London School of 
Economics. He was also a founding and leading member of the “Sozialwissenschaftlicher 
Bildungsverein in Wien”, the first German speaking social science organization (Müller 2004), a 
journalist, a manager of the industrial association of Austria, and a high level civil servant of the 
Austrian State after World War I. Scientifically he was mainly known for his critical works on race 
theories (Hertz 1915) and on nation building (Hertz 1927), as well as works on the structure of the 
Austrian economy WWI.  
Why did institutionalized sociology end at Halle University in 1933? In the case of Hertz’s sociology, 
the fascists despised the content of its orientation, theories, publications, and lectures. Hertz not 
only attacked the pseudo-science of race studies in books since 1904, he also criticized the first 
professor of race studies, Hans Günther—who was appointed by the Thuringian provincial Nazi 
government (Hertz 1930)—as unscientific. Soundly attacking a core Weltanschauung of the 
totalitarian regime made Hertz one of the most hated professors at the university among Nazi 
students. A Nazi press campaign tried to denounce Hertz as a terrorist who helped to organize a 
violent attack on Günther, and the preparation of a Nazi student boycott led to Hertz’s resignation 
as professor. To save his life and that of his family he fled to Vienna and later was exiled in Britain. 
What kind of sociology ended at Halle University with Hertz’ departure in 1933? We are fortunate 
that, in addition to his publications, we have the manuscript of a lecture on “Current sociological 
theories,” which he gave in the winter semester of the 1932/33 academic session and with which he 
planned to conclude the summer semester of 1933. In general, his publications (Hertz 1927; 1929; 
1931a; 1931b) show that his empirical work is in the tradition of historical sociology, which tried to 
analyze societies by comparing conditions and results in macrosociological constellations and by 
sketching lines of development both realized and sometimes only seen possibilities. Steinmetz 
(2010) claimed that this kind of historical sociology was typical of German Weimar sociology and, 
due to its rejection in countries of exile, found a dead end. Its approach was taken up again in the 
1960s. 
It seems appropriate to look more closely into what was meant by historical sociology at that time, 
particularly by Hertz. Two main projects were pursued within historical sociology. One tried to 
achieve a history of ideas in their societal embedding: for example, the development of the modern 
idea of “race” is sketched and analyzed as an ideology to transfer feudal prestige notions to larger 
units like nations (Hertz 1931a). In this line of thought, developmental notions are as important as 
analytical components. Another set of ideas that were even more prominent in Weimar sociology, 
aim to develop a typology of pure types of forms and their logic from historical and spatial 
comparisons. In an article on forms of nation Hertz (1927) proceeded by describing the history of the 
idea of nation, defining its core components as being related to states—a form of community feeling 
with different contents and a will of belonging—and distinguishes and analyses types of nation state, 
language nation, descent nation, race nation, belief in common descent nation. Similarly in 1929 
Hertz’s historical and contemporary material on migration is a starting point for typological work 
that forms general theories on relations of patterns of action and societal formations.  
Hertz’s empirical approach in his 1932 & 33 lecture on sociological theory is very much in line with 
Abel (1929), whose book forms the core of his lecture. In his fascinating book, Abel argues that 
looking into the work of current German sociologists can solve the problem of a foundation of the 
specialized discipline sociology, both in theory and method. He states that Simmel was right in his 
approach to single out interaction as a basic object of a specializing science of sociology, but also 
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criticizes him for his lacking systematization, methods and for the impracticality of differentiating 
form and content. Abel is even more critical towards the phenomenological approach of Vierkandt. 
He supports von Wiese in his effort to reconcile quantitative methodology and theory, but is critical 
of his lack of empirical work. Abel presents Weber’s work as seminal as he solves problems of both 
theory and methodology, and also conducts empirical studies. In his lecture, Hertz wholeheartedly 
supports Abel’s argument, which would become important step towards the later synthesis of 
classical sociological theory by Parsons in 1937. Using Hertz’s own terms, a sociology that is centered 
on patterns of action that relate to historical circumstances should be value-free and empirical. This 
is completely in line with Abel’s theorizing. The only difference is that Hertz also supports practical 
sociology, which is problem-centered. 
If there is such a strong reciprocal link between German Weimar sociology and international 
sociological theory building, as seen in the work of Abel and Hertz, are we still able to proclaim a 
dead end to the Weimar sociology? I think there is still a positive answer to this question. The local 
answer is that after Hertz’s forced exile, his kind of sociology was no longer followed in Halle (and 
many other places in Germany). Further, Parsons follows Abel’s lead, but he cuts back historical 
dimensions in his work from the 1930s to the 1950s. And Hertz, continuing his work in exile, shifts 
his empirical focus from historic-typological theory building towards historical narrative, 
increasingly neglecting general theory (Hertz 1957; 1962; 1975). Therefore, the specific Weimar 
historical sociology that combined typological work with vast historical material came to an end due 
to a forced change of context. 
4.3 STOLLBERG AND SOCIOLOGY IN A COMMUNIST STATE, 1965–1990 
Between 1950 and 1964 no academic sociology was allowed in the communist German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). After this sociology was reintroduced at university level, though at a quantatively 
very low level (Meyer 1996). In Halle, Rudhard Stollberg, held the only professorship for sociology 
from 1965 to 1990. These 25 years provide a much better opportunity to look more into the details 
of the relation between sociology and totalitarianism than the shorter Nazi period. Was there a 
tension between the two, and if so, what form did it take? 
Stollberg studied political economy at Halle University during the 1950s. Under the GDR, it became 
common to appoint in-house professors, as is the case with Stollberg. Like most GDR sociologists, 
he specialized in the sociology of work. He was proud of his international conferences on the topic, 
he even hosted a meeting of a research council of the International Sociological Association (ISA) in 
spring 1989. As a loyal member of the communist party, he belonged to the core group of sociologists 
who organized teaching and research programs for the GDR. 
According to Geiger (1956) a totalitarian regime like the GDR would not tolerate ‘sociology proper’, 
but only ‘sociology light,’ which served the demands of the state for ‘glorification’ and social 
engineering.  
To corroborate this thesis, we analyze an important study of Stollberg and his team on shift work 
(Jugel, Spangenberg and Stollberg 1978). We do find some glorification of the regime insofar as 
socialism is treated as constituting a lifestyle in contrast to capitalism without structural 
contradictions (ibid: 5, 24). Shift work, for example, is seen as “progressive” (ibid: 8) in socialism 
where in capitalism it is exploitative. However, ‘glorification’ is not the book’s central purpose. its 
focus is more on social engineering. It provides a quantitative empirical study on the effects of shift 
work on family life, leisure, and health, describing quantitatively how shift work is disruptive to 
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family life and health, but less so to leisure. Is it adequate to qualify this empirical work somewhat 
derogatively as social engineering and not, as Stollberg would have termed it, as practical sociology? 
For practical purposes, both seek means to achieve specified goals, not at finding and evaluating ends 
of action. In this context, Stollberg’s book tries to find ways to alleviate the negative effects of shift 
work by giving advice to managers of companies (ibid: 18, 125–128). For example: the same shift 
rhythms for spouses are less disruptive for families; cooperation with child caring institutions lessens 
stress on children; a switch of shift start times to 7 am, 3 pm and 11 pm would be more healthy than 
the existing patterns; participation of children in the decision making of families (ibid: 49); and 
participation of workers at the introduction of shift work (ibid: 128) are encouraged. Despite the 
somewhat paternalistic orientation of most parts of the book, there seems to be no clear dividing line 
between social engineering and practical sociology. There is, however, a difference between 
‘sociology light’ and ‘sociology proper,’ per Geiger, insofar as Stollberg observes that a general 
discussion of the pros and cons of an extension of shift work is beyond the limits of his book. The 
extension of shift work is an established fact, set by the political decisions of the Communist Party 
and the Communist State, which are cited in the book, and which are beyond criticism. However, 
even trying to keep to the limits of ‘sociology light,’ Western scientific observers (and communist 
functionaries in the GDR) saw Stollberg’s implicit critique of shift work as “sociologist of work 
Rudhard Stollberg keeps to be the only person who […] dares to express a fundamental critique of 
shift work” (Voigt 1986: 160). One could conclude that both sociological authors and totalitarian 
observers police the thin line between ‘sociology proper’ and ‘sociology light.’  
A more fundamental problem of following the approach of ‘sociology light’ in a totalitarian regime is 
brought to light in the conflict around the dissident Bahro, which seems to have influenced 
Stollberg’s scientific work more than the controversies around his sociology of work (Pasternack 
2013a: 130–142). Rudolf Bahro wrote a PhD thesis in 1975 on low and high level managers in 
industrial companies in the GDR, which included an appendix of notes on 48 interviews. Stollberg 
did not supervise this work, but wrote an expert opinion which was slightly critical (evaluated “cum 
laude”). Stollberg did not know that the State Secret Police had already read the interviews and were 
appalled by the critical content of the managers’ comments on their work. They intervened by 
declaring the dissertation “secret” and appointing two additional expert opinions for the dissertation, 
which stood in opposition to the three existing positive opinions to produce an overall negative vote 
and the dissertation was thus failed. Bahro was imprisoned, but was successful in smuggling a more 
radical book out of the country, which was published in West Germany in 1977 as one of the most 
important dissident works in East Germany. Later that year Bahro was expelled from the country 
and went to West Germany. Thus in 1977, Stollberg had to criticize himself for his insufficient 
vigilance in his evaluation of the dissertation in various committees: the party organization at the 
university; the management of the university; and in a party assembly, where he had to defend 
himself against eviction from the communist party. There were no further sanctions against him, 
except for more intensive observation by the State Secret Police. 
Reflecting on the relationship between sociology and totalitarian regimes, two aspects of the Bahro 
affair stand out: Bahro’s empirical material work, which annoyed to a key organization of the 
totalitarian regime, the State Secret Police; and that Stollberg was criticized for his evaluation of this 
work without recommending that the empirical material should be censored. Stollberg was a 
sociologist loyal to the regime and so not recommending this was impossible. Therefore the Secret 
Police secretly noted that Stollberg’s self-critique at the public humiliations was not convincing: “His 
whole behavior was artificial” (Pasternack 2013a: 136). The arbitrary repression of a totalitarian 
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regime is nearly impossible to adapt to, thus, even ‘sociology light’ is a strategy in which reprimand 
cannot be avoided. 
For me the reaction to this kind of repression seems to be important. There is, as Merton (1949) lists, 
a whole range of behavior with which to react to a situation in which one’s demands diverge from the 
opportunities a society offers. Rebellion would be a way to openly oppose the power structure. In her 
analysis of the work of GDR sociologists during communism, Sparschuh (2005: 40) criticizes the 
lack of open opposition in GDR sociology. There was no important dissident or central reformer 
within GDR sociology like Zaslavskaya (1984) in Russia. In a totalitarian regime, the arbitrary and 
harsh sanctions of the regime make rebellion an unlikely pattern of behavior: “Fear produces 
inaction, or more accurately, routinized action” (Merton 1949: 204). A plausible reaction to 
totalitarianism, therefore, is ritualism; in other words one no longer believes in the accepted goals of 
the society, but nevertheless one conforms to the means of achieving it. In Stollberg’s book on “Why 
and what for sociology” (Stollberg 1985) one sees a tendency to transform ‘sociology light’ into a 
ritualistic science. We will look closely at this book in what follows. 
A general statement, which hinders sociology like other social sciences in communism, is that the 
totalitarian regime determines its Weltanschauung as a theory that is already complete. Ettrich 
(1997) sees this preset theory as a major difficulty that crippled the development of sociology in the 
GDR. In a personal footnote in his book, Stollberg states that the following questions are open: 
“Enthält der historische Materialismus sämtliche oder nur die Grundaussagen einer allgemeinen 
Soziologie?” (Stollberg 1985: 69). Both statements imply that the totalitarian Weltanschauung 
historical materialism must be kept as the dominant sociological theory. The aim of sociology is “to 
help by its research to uncover laws, formulate them scientifically, which determine the functioning 
and the development of society. These laws are called social or sociological laws” (ibid: 9). Despite 
this natural science terminology, Stollberg is not able to formulate “laws” beyond the 
Weltanschauung. He states that there are three important questions for sociology: “What historical 
stage is reached?” (ibid: 49); “What relations show up?” (ibid: 53); and “In what direction moves the 
development?” (ibid: 54). These questions (and their answers) indicate that the Weltanschauung of 
historical materialism should guide the research. As western sociology is interwoven with its method 
of production, it is deemed a “manager of social ills” (ibid: 158). One can conclude that, from this 
perspective, neither cooperation with international sociology nor autonomous work on sociological 
theory appears advisable, both are risky because one either competes with historical materialism or 
risks becoming ‘infected’ by foreign dangers. The way out of this dilemma is to concentrate only on 
sociological methods (ibid: 97–136), special sociologies (ibid: 75), and saying that sociology “fulfills 
an instrumental function” (ibid: 87). The concept of a ‘sociology light’ that Stollberg presents in 1985 
is very similar to that in his book on shift work. He tries to keep to empirical, practical sociology, 
accepting the limits that the Weltanschauung places on his work. The low-key, subdued enthusiasm 
still perceptable in his work of the 1970s is turning into ritualism. The necessities of ‘sociology light’ 
are described as facts of a small world to which one has to adapt. Therefore, the risk of ‘sociology 
light’ within totalitarian regimes lies not only in the danger of being arbitrarily attacked—even if 
respecting its limits—but also an internal risk insofar as a growing experience of these limits turns 
scientific enthusiasm into ritualistic action. 
Was the kind of GDR sociology that Stollberg represented at a dead end in 1990? In contrast with 
discussions on the dead end of parts of Weimar sociology in 1933, we find a number of actors who 
try to answer this question in the early 1990s, but hardly any contemporary discussion on this topic. 
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Stollberg himself indirectly answers the question; he became ill and did not participate in the debate. 
In terms of Merton’s typology, one could say that Stollberg reacted to the new constellation of the 
sudden unforeseen revolution in the GDR by retreat, which seems to support the interpretation that 
the inner nexus between the totalitarian regime and ‘sociology light’ was already loosened in the 
1980s. 
Younger East German scientists tried to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the sociology of 
work in Halle (Schippling 1992). It has been said that its empirical knowledge of a decline of work 
satisfaction between 1967 and 1987 was valuable, but it lacked a stronger link to the critical 
theoretical thinking of West German authors.  
West German observers, like the director of the institute for research on work and professions, judge 
this work even more critically. Stollberg’s sociology of work was not sociology in a scientific sense 
because as it only aimed at adaptation of work and did not question its societal purpose (Buttler, 
1992). West German Lothar Peter, a frequent guest at Halle in GDR times, was more differentiated: 
Despite the fatal connection of sociology with historical materialism and its concept of law, the 
sociology of work by Stollberg produced sound empirical research that he interpreted normatively 
instead of pursuing more the phenomena of a change of values (Peter 1990). 
It is worth noting that because of the specific circumstances of the East German transformation—a 
combination of an East German revolution and unification with the far bigger West Germany—it was 
West German scientists who evaluated the continuity or discontinuity of East German sociology. 
Lepsius, as the West German organizer of the re-establishment of a department of sociology in Halle 
University, reported on the scientific qualifications of the GDR department staff. He evaluated them 
as scientifically sound and not as informants for the State Secret Police and recommended the 
prolongation of their contracts (Lepsius 2002). The ministry of the new Bundesland, however, 
refused to continue the employment of any of the sociologists without giving any specific reason. 
Thus the dead end of GDR sociology in Halle after reunification was institutionally quite radical. 
In conclusion, one can state that there was a certain tension between sociology and the communist 
totalitarian regime of the GDR. This did not hold only for the period of its repression before the mid 
1960s, but which lasted until 1990. The tension between this science discipline and the totalitarian 
regime is stronger than for many other disciplines, because the totalitarian Weltanschauung is seen 
as a superior sociological theory thus crippling open sociological reflection. Geiger’s thesis of a 
selective acceptance of a ‘sociology light’ in the form of social engineering has been found to reflect 
both the self-declared aims of its scientists, who would prefer the term practical science, and the 
constraints of regulated State research policy. Surprisingly however, and not in accordance with 
Geiger’s views, even the practice of ‘sociology light’ produced a number of conflicts, principally due 
to the arbitrary nature of the totalitarian regime, which enforced rigid programs of ‘sociology light’ 
which had a tendency to act out an inner logic and regress towards ritualistic science. 
5. Elective affinity of sociology and democracy? Tension between 
totalitarianism and sociology? 
Can we draw any general conclusions from this study? First, one has to draw attention to its 
quantitative limits; a single case study never guarantees statistical robustness. It would be 
worthwhile to test hypotheses of this study with a higher number of countries and years. However, 
that was not the aim of this research, which just focuses on the mechanisms causing either a tension 
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between sociology and totalitarianism or an elective affinity between sociology and democracy. From 
the existing literature, five hypotheses were put forward—coincidental; against core of sociology 
proper; only sociology light; totalitarian perception; shift of context—which can now be refined in 
light of the empirical material of 20th century development at one “normal” East German university.  
The first thesis claims that the higher percentage of sociological dead ends as the Weimar Republic 
turned to a fascist regime was coincidental; that it was mainly the result of a higher percentage of 
Jews in this discipline. As I have shown, all sociology professors in Halle University were forced into 
exile in 1933. Even within the broader perspective of all professors of science of the state, of which 
sociology was a part, still 100% were forced to resign. Current estimates for all faculties state that the 
Nazis evicted 9% of all Halle professors (Bruch 2013: xxxiii–xxxiv). Therefore, in Halle social science 
evictions were 10 times higher than in other disciplines. Current estimates for German sociology 
professors evicted or exiled depend on methods used, but range from 42% (Wittebur 1991: 134) to 
78% (Neuloh 1986: 24), a current reanalysis with data from Kürschners Gelehrten Kalender 
estimates 66% (Holzhauser 2015: 143). This would be about four times higher than the German 
average of 16% (Bruch 2013: xxxiii). The high specifity of sociology and social sciences being 
forcefully evicted makes a coincidental relationship highly unlikely. Therefore, we have to refute the 
first thesis at least as most important process. A closer look at the Halle cases in the sciences of the 
state shows that Aubin was transferred for political reasons. Hertz, as we have seen, was also forced 
to resign for political reasons. (The fact that his grandparents practiced Judaism is, in this case, 
coincidental not causal.) Jahn was forced to resign in 1937 because the Nazis classified his wife as 
Jewish. Grünfeld, despite being Christian, was dismissed in 1933 because his grandparents were of 
the Jewish faith. For individuals the label “Jewish” was arbitrary as the Nazi criterion did not refer 
to individual actions or decisions but set irrational descent criteria.  
A second thesis says that totalitarianism clashes with ‘sociology proper’. In the case studies above, 
we showed that a clash between totalitarian Weltanschauung and ‘sociology proper’ can sometimes 
cause tension. Hertz’s scientific books analyzing race studies as an unscientific enterprise, brought 
about the political pressures for him to resign. Hertz is rather singular in his scientific focus but, as 
Schleiff (2009) has shown, the organizers of the founding session of the German Sociological 
Association in 1910—especially Weber—arranged things systematically in such a way that the race 
paradigm was shown off as prototypical social science, which always comes to wrong conclusions 
because uses natural science theories to explain social phenomena. Therefore, being against race 
theories was part of the core mainstream sociological epistemology until 1933. As Hertz was present 
at some of these sociological meetings he could legitimately, with his critique of race theories, be 
seen as representative of mainstream ‘sociology proper.’ 
Despite being very different in content, historical materialism as a Weltanschauung of 20th century 
totalitarian communist regimes also clashed with sociology, as we showed in the case of Stollberg. 
Regarded as a superior sociological theory, historical materialism hindered sociological theory 
building in communist countries. Other sociological theories risked being interpreted as competing 
with the Weltanschauung. To avoid this risk many sociologists, like Stollberg, tried to refrain from 
theory building to reduce the likelihood of sanctions.  
Thus, one has to conclude that an important mechanism that brings ‘sociology proper’ into tension 
with totalitarian regimes lies in the social science content of their Weltanschauung. Despite the fact 
that both Nazi and Communist Weltanschauungen tried to claim a natural science status for their 
ideologies, both had social science arguments that clashed more with sociology as a science than they 
did with natural sciences. 
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There is no systematic evidence that the tension between ‘sociology proper’ and totalitarianism 
results from a critical stance towards power in general, as Geiger suggests. A sufficient number of 
sociologists are willing to cooperate with totalitarian regimes for different reasons, a number that 
appears to be neither higher nor lower than in other disciplines.  
A third hypothesis states that ‘sociology light,’ in the form of propaganda or social engineering, is 
more likely to be tolerated by totalitarian regimes than other forms of sociology. Indeed the case of 
Stollberg shows that social engineering was both the kind of sociology the state wanted and what its 
sociologists tried to deliver. In comparing Hertz and Stollberg we see that both propagate practical 
sociology, which some will classify as a form of social engineering because its aim is to find solutions 
to fixed problems. We see a clear increase of means at hand between 1930 and 1980 for such an 
orientation because empirical methods flourished at this time. However, the case of Stollberg shows 
that even ‘sociology light’ has the potential for tension with totalitarian regimes and that there seem 
to be different forms of conflict between ‘sociology light’ and totalitarianism. 
Some are the results of a somewhat naïve interpretation of applied sociology, which are shared by 
advocates of practical sociology in totalitarian regimes and critics of social engineering. Both imply 
that a benevolent/malevolent manager/ruler will, with the help of social engineering, be able to 
rationalize his rule (and thereby stabilize the totalitarian regime). However, conflicts with ‘sociology 
light’ arise because the manager/ruler who is central to this totalitarian concept sometimes resists 
change (Pasternack 2013a: 128). Even the implicit critique of ‘sociology light’ of the empirically 
measured effects of shift work is seen as challenging to the existing order (Pasternack 2013c: 181–
187). Conflicts of this kind are not uncommon in many fields of science, as all science—even sociology 
light—can innovate and challenge established views and routines. As shown in the analysis of the 
Stollberg’s book on shift work, one observes both an attempt to keep to the limits of ‘sociology light,’ 
but also to hold on to the critical information of empirical work. One could even say that conflicts of 
this kind, which take place both within the role set of social scientist within a totalitarian regime and 
beyond in relation to different interaction partners, are driving forces that may also motivate. 
‘Sociology light’ is also affected by different kinds of conflicts about the general nature of the 
arbitrariness of totalitarian regimes. The circumstances around the Bahro affair show that standard 
procedures of ‘sociology light,’ such as including empirical appendices or evaluating PhD theses 
according to scientific criteria, can sometimes result in dangerous, publicly humiliating. We saw that 
these arbitrary interventions in social science work, which are far more common in totalitarian 
regimes than in democracies, seem to affect the habitus of ‘sociology light’ because a possible form 
of reaction to these interventions is ritualism. It would appear that the difference between ‘sociology 
light’ and ritualism is small as neither problematizes certain core values/institutions/aims. Seen 
from the perspective of the individual however, ‘sociology light’ is something practiced in a subdued 
consent, which allows the authorities to test limits from time to time and sometimes be proud of 
progress. Ritualism is a stricter form of hypocrisy because external forces are seen as so strong and 
incalculable that only a strict limitation of one’s actions can protect against sanctions. As we have 
seen, Stollberg seems to have shifted his ‘sociology light’ concept in the direction of ritualism, which 
reduces inner involvement with science. Other observers of ‘sociology light’ in totalitarian regimes 
have also come to the conclusion that it appears ritualistic in some core passages (cf. Ettrich 1997). 
In conclusion, the third thesis has to be refined on the basis of the empirical study. Sociology light in 
the form of social engineering is a concept that is more tolerated by totalitarian regimes and aimed 
at by sociologists, but it is no safeguard against tensions with totalitarian regimes and possible 
degenerations of its inner logic towards ritualism. 
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A fourth hypothesis states that the totalitarian perceptions of sociology as critical science bring about 
dead ends in sociology. We showed how external images were important in the development of 
sociology in Halle. In the case of Hertz and the dead end of sociology in 1933, we showed that he was 
among the few sociologists who was really a critical scientist and therefore, in his case, his status 
cannot be said to have brought about the dead end. In the case of Grünfeld and early sociology up 
until 1918, however, we showed that the image of sociology as a foreign (democratic) discipline was 
important in causing even young critical scientists with an affinity to sociological themes to distance 
themselves from the new discipline. In the case of Bahro, one can see that even raw empirical 
material can be seen as “critical” because totalitarian regimes tend to suppress any descriptive 
information about their state. Thus, in conclusion, the fourth thesis also has to be refined. Non-
democratic regimes’ critical perceptions of sociology are decisive for the initial blocking or repression 
of sociology. However, at later stages the everyday procedures of sociology can cause tensions with 
totalitarian regimes that are largely independent of its general image.  
The fifth thesis sees causal effects of a forced shift of context via emigration as resulting in dead ends 
in sociology. Hertz’s case supports the thesis that Weimar historical sociology could not be 
undertaken in exile. Like most other sociologists above the age of 55, he was not able to continue his 
work as a professor in exile (Fleck 2007: 236). Unlike many émigrés he had good language skills, he 
had contacts within both academia and public life in Britain, and he had sufficient resources to 
continue scientific work. Despite these exceptionally positive circumstances, the project of 
typological historical sociology shifted its focus in a way that strengthens Steinmetz’s (2010) 
hypothesis that historical sociology in the Weimar sociological tradition came to a dead end because 
it did not flourish after a forced change of context. Similarly, we saw that the GDR tradition of 
sociology of work ended with the end of the GDR. One possible cause is that it was already on the 
brink to petrifying into ritualism already before the demise of the GDR. More important, however, 
were the harsh West German political and scientific evaluations, which brought it to an end with the 
change of society. With reference to thesis five, we can confirm that forced shifts of context in a 
number of countries are an important cause of dead ends in sociology in the 20th century. 
In conclusion one can state that sociology, out of reasons of its own logic—both as ‘sociology proper’ 
and ‘sociology light’—tends to be victimized more often in totalitarian regimes than many other 
scientific disciplines and therefore, dead ends of scientific lines of thought caused by shifts of political 
regimes are rather more likely than in other disciplines. We have shown a number of mechanisms 
that produce systematic tensions between sociology and totalitarianism. There are also a number of 
indicators that show how sociology prospers better in democratic than in totalitarian regimes. 
However, this elective affinity between democracy and sociology seems to result from democracy 
giving sociology more opportunity to follow its scientific aims than any specific preference or 
sociologists being more democratic in their views than other scientists. A systematic comparison of 
disciplines in their relation to political regimes was, however, beyond the limits of this study. 
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